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ABSTRACT 
One of the pressing issues in marketing is whether loyalty programs really enhance 
behavioral loyalty. Loyalty program members may have a much higher share-of-wallet at the 
firm with the loyalty program than non-members have, but this does not necessarily imply 
that loyalty programs are effective. Loyal customers may select themselves to become 
members in order to benefit from the program. Since this implies that program membership is 
endogenous, we estimate models for both the membership decision (using instrumental 
variables) and for the effect of membership on share-of-wallet, our measure of behavioral 
loyalty. We use panel data from a representative sample of Dutch households who report their 
loyalty program memberships for all seven loyalty programs in grocery retailing as well as 
their expenditures at each of the 20 major supermarket chains. We find a small positive yet 
significant effect of loyalty program membership on share-of-wallet. This effect is seven 
times smaller than is suggested by a naïve model that ignores the endogeneity of program 
membership. The predictive validity of the proposed model is much better than for the naïve 
model. Our results show that creating loyalty program membership is a crucial step to 
enhance share-of-wallet, and we provide guidelines how to achieve this. 
 
Keywords: loyalty programs, grocery retailing, endogeneity, tobit-II model, attraction models  
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INTRODUCTION 
The effect of loyalty programs on loyalty is a topic of debate. Most loyalty programs 
do not turn all disloyal customers into loyals or make customers exclusively loyal. This does 
not mean that a loyalty program cannot be a useful tool. As expressed by Koslowsky (1999): 
“While none of these programs result in a perfect world, each can generate that little extra that 
can provide the retail marketer with potential tactical weapons”. A supermarket manager 
describes the added value of its loyalty program as follows: “You don’t have 100 percent of a 
share of a customer’s wallet. Customers shop about five times a month. Maybe you’ll get 
three of those trips and the competition gets two. The loyalty program eliminates at least one 
shopping trip you weren’t getting and creates an additional shopping trip to your store” 
(Cioletti, 2001). Hence, it is important to correctly quantify that ‘little extra’ that a loyalty 
program can offer to a retailer.  
Recently, many retail companies have introduced loyalty programs to enhance 
customer loyalty (Kumar & Reinartz, 2005). Loyalty programs are currently available in 
many industries, such as supermarkets, gasoline stations, and clothing stores (Leenheer & 
Bijmolt, 2003; Lewis, 1997). Loyalty programs provide members with benefits such as 
discounts and saving rewards, which make these programs popular among consumers 
(Liebermann, 1999). In the United States, almost 80% of all households have at least one 
supermarket loyalty card, and in Canada this is even 90% (ACNielsen, Consumer Insight, 
2002). 
Extant empirical research provides mixed evidence of loyalty program effectiveness. 
Some studies found positive effects of retail loyalty programs on purchase behavior (Bell & 
Lal, 2003; Lewis, 2004; Taylor & Neslin, 2005), whereas others provide evidence of loyalty 
programs that do not generate any effects (Mägi, 2003; DeWulf, Odekerken-Schröder, & 
Iacobucci, 2001; Sharp & Sharp, 1997). This ambiguity may relate at least partly to the fact 
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that methodological limitations hinder proper assessment of loyalty programs effects. A 
potential problem is that customers who are already loyal may have a higher likelihood to 
enroll into the program, leading to an overestimation of the loyalty program effect. In other 
words, expenditure differences between members and non-members (Van Heerde and 
Bijmolt, 2005) may be partly driven by self-selection of the most loyal customers into the 
loyalty program. To illustrate our point, we show in Table 1 descriptive statistics for our 
empirical study on grocery loyalty programs. There are substantial differences in share-of-
wallet (SOW) between members and non-members: the average share-of-wallet of members 
is 36%, which is 29 percentage points higher than the average share-of wallet of non-members 
(7%). The central question of this study is to what extent this gap is due to self-selection and 
to what extent loyalty programs really enhance behavioral loyalty. Existing research has 
ignored this self-selection or endogeneity problem, as argued by Bolton, Lemon, and Verhoef 
(2004). They propose that a thorough solution for this problem is needed before any 
conclusion can be made on loyalty program effectiveness.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
This paper aims to measure the impact of loyalty programs on customer loyalty while 
controlling for endogeneity due to self-selecting members by using a model with instrumental 
variables. We apply our model to data from a representative Dutch sample of 1909 
households who report their loyalty program memberships for all seven loyalty programs in 
Dutch grocery retailing as well as their expenditures at each of the 20 major supermarket 
chains. The wide and empirical scope of the study allows us to conclude that loyalty programs 
really enhance behavioral loyalty, albeit seven times less than what we would conclude if we 
did not control for self-selecting members. This paper also aims to deepen the substantive 
knowledge about what determines the effectiveness of loyalty programs, as called for by Jain 
and Singh (2002). Though experimental research indicates that the effectiveness of loyalty 
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programs depends on the program’s design (Kivetz & Simonson, 2002a; Roehm, Bolman 
Pullins, & Roehm, 2002; Van Osselaer, Alba, & Manchanda, 2003; Yi & Jeon, 2003), there is 
no evidence from empirical field data to date. In this paper we study two loyalty program 
design elements: the discount percentage and the percentage of a household’s expenditures 
that is redeemed as a saving program reward. Our findings suggest that these design elements 
do affect the decision to enroll in a program, but they do not impact the effectiveness of 
loyalty programs once consumers are enrolled.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops a conceptual 
framework on the relation between loyalty programs and purchase behavior. Section 3 
discusses the data of our empirical study, and Section 4 describes the model. A presentation of 
the results follows, and we conclude with a discussion.  
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Customer Loyalty 
The marketing literature provides a wide range of loyalty measures (Odin, Odin, & 
Valette-Florence, 2001), and their usefulness depends on the specific market and study 
objective. The main distinction in loyalty measures is between attitudinal loyalty and 
behavioral loyalty (Dick & Basu, 1994). Since we are interested in the effects of loyalty 
programs on actual purchase behavior, our key dependent variable captures behavioral 
loyalty. In grocery retailing, purchase behavior is characterized by high buying frequency and 
variation in basket sizes (Kahn & Schmittlein, 1992). Further, consumers are often regular 
buyers at different companies (Kahn & McAlister, 1997), a phenomenon referred to as 
polygamous loyalty (Dowling & Uncles, 1997). Given these characteristics, share-of-wallet is 
the most suitable measure for behavioral loyalty (Berger et al., 2002; Mägi, 2003). Share-of-
wallet measures the share of category expenditures spent on purchases at a certain company, 
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which integrates choice behavior and transaction sizes during a certain time period into one 
single measure. 
  
Effectiveness of loyalty programs: accounting for self-selecting members  
In line with previous research (e.g. Sharp &  Sharp, 1997; Yi & Jeon, 2003), we define 
a loyalty program as an integrated system of marketing actions that aims to make member 
customers more loyal. The central question is whether loyalty program members become 
more loyal due to their memberships. Customers do not become loyalty program members 
randomly. Rather, a customer becomes a member of the loyalty program if the expected 
benefits are higher than the expected costs, a choice that is partly driven by the attraction of 
the store itself (Mauri, 2003). Because loyal customers derive the highest benefits from a 
loyalty program, those customers who are already loyal are most likely to participate (Bolton, 
Lemon, & Verhoef, 2004). From an econometric perspective, this comes down to an 
endogeneity problem. The relevant issue is that in a model with share-of-wallet as the 
dependent variable and loyalty program membership as an independent variable, the loyalty 
program membership variable and the error term of the model are positively correlated. Due 
to this positive correlation, the influence of loyalty program membership will be 
overestimated (Greene, 2000, p.370; Verbeek, 2000, p.121). Although including additional 
observed independent variables that drive share-of-wallet (such as location or price) might 
mitigate the problem, this solution does not correct for unobserved independent variables 
(Franses, 2005). 
The solution for endogeneity we follow is two-stage least squares (2SLS). We must 
(and do) identify variables (instruments) that influence the loyalty program membership 
decision of a household, but that are unrelated to the household’s share-of-wallet. We first 
estimate a model for loyalty program membership, with the instruments and other available 
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variables as independent variables. The predicted values from this model (instead of the 
observed loyalty program memberships) should then be imputed as an independent variable in 
the main model for share-of-wallet (more details are discussed later in this paper).  
In Figure 1, we present our framework for studying loyalty program membership and 
share-of-wallet. The share-of-wallet for a store depends on its attraction compared to the 
attraction of competitors. We now discuss several drivers of a store’s attraction. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Effect of Loyalty Program Membership on Store Attraction 
The central driver in this study is loyalty program membership. Loyalty programs 
enhance customer loyalty through several economic, psychological and sociological 
mechanisms. From an economic perspective, loyalty programs provide members with value in 
the form of rewards. A second economic driver consists of switching costs, because loyalty 
program members lose value if they stop purchasing from the company. The value lost 
consists of saving points or a purchasing track record that ensures privileges. Economic-
oriented research has used the switching cost argument as a rationale for the existence of 
loyalty programs (Kim, Shi, & Srinivasan, 2001; Klemperer, 1987; Kopalle & Neslin, 2003)1. 
Because of switching costs, a loyalty program creates a certain degree of calculative 
commitment or stickiness in customers’ relation with the company (Johnson, Gustafsson, 
Andreassen, Levik, & Cha, 2001). Calculative commitment can be defined as the extent to 
which consumers perceive the need to maintain a relationship, given the significant 
termination or switching costs associated with leaving (Geyskens, Steenkamp, Scheer, & 
Kumar, 1996).  
                                                 
1 If the collected points and privileges do not expire (as is often the case in grocery retailing), there is no 
switching cost to a consumer who switches temporarily to a competitor. However, if the switch is permanent, the 
consumer incurs the switching cost of foregoing the collected rewards and privileges, even if these do not expire. 
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Further, several psychological drivers enhance customer loyalty. First of all, 
consumers appreciate rewards -- not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to other 
consumers (Feinberg, Krishna, & Zhang, 2002). Knowing that you are provided with better 
value than others creates feelings of being a preferred or special customer, and thereby further 
stimulates loyal behavior. Second, loyalty program incentives can induce smart shopper 
feelings (Kivetz & Simonson, 2002b), and pride about being economical (Chandon, Wansink, 
& Laurent, 2000; Schindler, 1998). The effort to obtain the reward may even justify luxury 
consumption (Kivetz & Simonson, 2002a). Third, existing research shows that customers 
overvalue the rewards they obtain, as they tend to maximize the value offered by the medium 
(the loyalty program), rather than the final outcome (Hsee, Yu, Zhang & Zhang, 2003; Van 
Osselaer, Alba, & Manchanda 2003). This implies that customers aim to maximize discounts 
and saving points, whereas it would be rational to assess the utility of the final products and 
rewards minus the disutility of their costs.  
Loyalty programs can also have sociological effects. The need to belong to groups is a 
fundamental human motivation (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), and identification with 
commercial organizations is intensifying due to the growing centrality of consumption and 
materialistic desires in society (Fournier, 1998; Muniz & O'Guinn, 2001). Bhattacharya and 
Sen (2003) propose that strategies to develop customer identification are especially beneficial 
in industries where consumers purchase frequently, and differentiation between suppliers is 
low. DeWulf, Odekerken-Schröder, and Iacobucci (2001) show for relational investments in 
consumer-firm relationships the existence of a reciprocity norm: customers evoke obligation 
towards those who treat them well or provide value. In addition, customers who become 
members of the loyalty program are likely to identify more strongly with the company, 
because the membership relates them to a group of privileged customers (Bhattacharya, Rao, 
& Glynn, 1995; Oliver, 1999). Hence, loyalty programs can create affective commitment, a 
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generalized sense of positive regard for, and attachment to, the organization. In this way, 
loyalty programs not only buy, but also earn, customer loyalty (Edvardsson, Johnson, 
Gustafsson, & Strandvik, 2000).  
Overall, multiple drivers may create a positive effect of being a loyalty program 
member on the attractiveness of the store. This research does not aim to assess the relative 
importance of each driver, but rather aims to provide a proper empirical assessment of the 
overall effect. The importance of the drivers might also depend on loyalty program type 
(Bolton, Kannan, & Bramlett, 2000). The focus of our research is on loyalty programs that 
provide predominantly economic (tangible) rewards, but enrich them with some social 
(intangible) rewards. Therefore, we only study the moderating impact of economic design 
elements, as we discuss below. 
 
The Moderating Impact of Loyalty Program Design on Loyalty Program Effectiveness 
The effectiveness of a loyalty program is likely to depend on its design (Dowling & 
Uncles, 1997; Jain & Singh, 2002). An important element is how much monetary value the 
loyalty program gives to its members, and in which form. The key economic design elements 
of the loyalty program are its discount and saving features (Yi & Jeon, 2003). The program 
with a discount feature gives price discounts on certain items of the assortment for loyalty 
program members only. In this way, a discount feature supplies member customers with 
immediate rewards for their purchases (Yi & Jeon, 2003). The discount feature stimulates 
customers to purchase the items on promotion or to buy categories they usually buy in other 
stores. 
A program with a saving feature gives loyalty program members saving points, 
dependent on the monetary amount spent at the company. A program member can redeem 
these points for a reward, such as a free product, after s/he has reached a saving threshold 
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(see, e.g., Hoch and Drèze 1998). The saving feature stimulates customers to show loyal 
purchase behavior to reach certain threshold levels (Lewis, 2004), which is called the points-
pressure mechanism (Taylor & Neslin, 2005). Further, a saving feature creates switching costs 
(Zhang, Krishna, & Dhar, 2000): if a consumer stops purchasing s/he loses the accumulated 
saving points.  
The question is whether a saving feature or a discount feature is more effective. A 
saving feature stimulates purchases of the entire assortment and not only of specific items (as 
the discount feature does). Obtaining saving rewards requires considerable consumer effort, 
so that we expect stronger feelings of uniqueness and pride (psychological drivers). A 
discount has, in contrast with saving points, a direct negative effect on share-of-wallet. On the 
other hand, customers prefer to obtain a reward immediately instead of getting it sometime in 
the future (Yi & Jeon, 2003). Further, the discount feature directly supports the supermarket’s 
value proposition (Dowling & Uncles, 1997). Finally, the saving feature may also have a 
positive effect on behavior after the reward has been redeemed (Taylor & Neslin, 2005). In 
sum, both saving and discount features contain attractive aspects to consumers, so that we do 
not have an ex-ante expectation of differences between moderating effects of the saving and 
the discount features. 
  
The Moderating Impact of Household Characteristics on Loyalty Program Effectiveness 
We expect that household characteristics moderate the effects of loyalty programs on 
the attraction of a store. Since grocery bills tend to be higher for larger households, the 
absolute monetary incentive they may derive from loyalty programs is higher than for smaller 
households. As a result, we expect loyalty program effects to be stronger for larger 
households. Families with higher incomes also tend to have higher grocery bills since they 
may buy more luxurious products. On the other hand, they may value the monetary rewards 
 9
from loyalty programs less than families with lower incomes. Hence, the sign of the 
moderating impact of household income on loyalty program effectiveness is not clear a priori.  
 
The Effects of Store and Household Variables on Store Attraction 
A store’s attractiveness depends on the benefits of the attributes offered by the store. 
Three important store attributes are proximity to the store (distribution density), price 
attractiveness, and service level (Kahn & McAlister, 1997). Extant research has found that 
households with different socio-demographic characteristics derive different benefits from the 
same store attributes, e.g. because of variation in opportunity costs (Bell & Lattin, 1998). We 
therefore expect that the relationship between a store variable and attraction is moderated by 
household characteristics. We do not include the main effects of household variables on a 
store’s attraction because from a theoretical perspective there is no a priori reason to expect 
some households to favor a particular store independent of that store’s attributes. In addition, 
these main effects cancel out in the chosen attraction model specification (see footnote 4). 
Closer average proximity (higher density of outlets of a retail company) enhances a 
chain’s attraction, because the expected travel costs are lower. However, a high distribution 
density is less important if the potential benefits of visiting a store further away are higher. 
These expected benefits are higher for larger basket sizes, which are associated with larger 
households (Bell & Lattin, 1998). For high-income households, different effects might 
counterbalance each other: these households have higher marginal costs of time, but the 
possession of cars and storage space diminish travel costs and increase basket sizes (Mittal, 
1994). In sum, we expect a positive effect of distribution density on attraction that is 
moderated negatively by household size and undeterminably by household income. 
We expect that a more attractive price and higher service levels increase a store's 
attractiveness. Income is expected to moderate the price attractiveness effect positively and 
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the service-level effect negatively. Larger households can benefit more from a low price 
setting because of larger basket sizes (Bell & Lattin, 1998), leading to a stronger effect of the 
attractive prices. These households may value service more because they have higher 
opportunity costs of time, and hence we expect that the service effect is positively moderated 
by household size. 
 
Drivers of Loyalty Program Membership 
When deciding whether to participate in a company’s loyalty program, a customer 
may compare the expected benefits and costs (Bell & Lal, 2003; Noble & Phillips, 2004). The 
most direct benefits accrue from the saving reward rate (percentage of money amount spent 
that is reimbursed as a saving program reward) and the discount rate (percentage immediate 
discount on all purchases) that the program offers. The higher the saving and discount rates, 
the higher the likelihood of program enrollment.  
We now focus on additional benefits and costs, which serve as instrumental variables 
in the 2SLS estimation. These benefits and costs are not related to the attraction of the specific 
store itself or its loyalty program, but refer to a consumer’s attitude and perceptions of loyalty 
programs in general.2 We assume that the general attitude consumers have towards loyalty 
programs can partly explain their memberships of specific programs, similar to what has been 
found for the usage of promotions and coupons (Chandon, Wansink, & Laurent 2000; Bawa 
& Shoemaker, 1987). We distinguish between perceived economic benefits (rewards) and 
non-economic (psychological and sociological) benefits. The more economic benefits a 
customer perceives to gain from loyalty programs in general, the higher the likelihood to 
enroll in any program. Non-economic benefits may also enhance the likelihood to enroll in a 
                                                 
2 A paradox in statistics is that it is impossible to test for the exogeneity of instrumental variables. The only 
support for the exogeneity of instrumental variables is by logical reasoning. Since our instrumental variables 
apply for loyalty programs in general and they are not related to share-of-wallet a consumer has at a particular 
store, we believe we can argue convincingly that they are valid instruments in the sense of being unrelated to the 
error term of the share-of-wallet model. 
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program. We note that because valid instruments need to be independent of a specific chain’s 
error term, both types of benefits are specified toward loyalty programs in retailing in general. 
In the data section we provide operationalizations for these variables. 
Economic costs are program membership fees (which does not apply in our setting). In 
addition, customers may face non-economic costs: loss of privacy. A customer who enters a 
loyalty program usually has to fill out a subscription form in which s/he must provide 
personal data. A company can use this information in combination with purchase data 
(registered through the loyalty program) to target households for direct mailings or to apply 
micro marketing. Some customers may not be willing to provide personal information, 
especially if this concerns personal identifiers such as address information (Phelps, Nowak, & 
Ferrell, 2000; Noble & Philips, 2003). This reluctance is caused by consumers’ need for 
control and a negative attitude towards direct marketing (Phelps, D'Souza, & Nowak, 2001). 
Hence, some customers may perceive potential privacy infringements of loyalty programs in 
general as a non-economic cost, leading to a decreased likelihood of loyalty program 
participation. Finally, to accommodate additional benefits and costs, we use loyalty program 
memberships in a different industry as another instrumental variable (see Figure 1). The 
notion is that the more loyalty programs a consumer has been enrolled in, the more likely it is 
that this consumer signs up for a particular program in a different industry.  
Finally, the decision to enroll may also depend on a customer’s loyalty to the store, 
which is the essence of the self-selection problem. In order to estimate the effect of loyalty 
program membership on attraction consistently with 2SLS, we need to include the drivers of a 
store’s attraction (household and store characteristics) as independent variables for the 
decision to become a member of a store’s loyalty program. 
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DATA DESCRIPTION 
To assess the effects of loyalty programs on behavioral loyalty, we conduct an 
empirical study of the Dutch supermarket industry. This industry is an interesting market for a 
study of loyalty programs, because consumers make transactions in supermarkets frequently, 
and can easily visit several supermarkets within a relative short time-interval. We have panel 
data on purchase behavior of 1909 Dutch households in supermarkets during two years. The 
panel members provide purchase information by scanning all their supermarket receipts with a 
home scanner. The data cover the period July 1998 until July 2000, and were provided by GfK 
Panel Services Benelux. We use data for each household on yearly expenditures in the largest 
twenty supermarket chains; these comprise 92.8% of all supermarket sales.  
We use a census of all seven loyalty programs in this industry, each of which uses 
loyalty cards for identification and registration. The main design elements of these programs 
are a discount feature and a saving feature. The discount feature provides price discounts on a 
varying set of items of the assortment. The saving feature provides saving points that are 
linearly dependent on the amount spent. Members must spend a pre-specified amount to reach 
the minimal redemption threshold and to exchange points for a reward (gifts or free products). 
The receipts report both the total discount earned with the loyalty card and the number of 
points saved. In addition, the loyalty programs sometimes give other rewards such as lotteries, 
direct mailings or member web pages. We limit the discussion of the loyalty program design 
to the discount and saving features, because there is no systematic variation in the other 
design elements.  
Table 1 shows the loyalty programs and their design elements, the market shares of the 
supermarket chains, and some customer base characteristics. Both large and small 
supermarket chains have introduced loyalty programs, and some of the largest supermarkets 
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in the Netherlands do not have a loyalty program. The customer base of a supermarket chain3 
is defined as those households that visited the chain at least once during a certain year.  
Panel households complete a yearly questionnaire in which they report on their loyalty 
program memberships at supermarkets. On average, 64% of a chain’s customer base is loyalty 
program member, and this number varies between supermarket chains from 47% (Konmar) to 
82% (Albert Heijn). About 88% of the panel households are members of at least one 
supermarket loyalty program. The duplication rate of loyalty program memberships is 
substantial: 33% of the panel households have two loyalty cards, 16% have three, and 4% 
have four or more loyalty cards. On average, a household holds 1.68 loyalty program 
memberships. 
 To operationalize the variables from Figure 1, we collected additional data, which we 
discuss below and summarize in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Instrumental variables 
We operationalize the instrumental variables for loyalty program membership based 
on a survey held in November 2000 among the panel households. This survey, conducted by 
the market research company, includes eight attitude statements about loyalty programs in 
general. Factor analysis on the items revealed the three instrumental variables we discussed 
before: perceived economic and non-economic benefits from loyalty program membership, 
and perceived non-economic costs: privacy concerns related to loyalty program memberships 
(Appendix A1). In addition, the survey contains questions about the number of memberships 
of the four largest gasoline loyalty programs. We use this information to operationalize our 
fourth instrumental variable “Loyalty program memberships in other industries”. The variable 
definitions are: 
ECBENi  = Economic benefits from loyalty program memberships perceived by household i; 
                                                 
3 From now on we will use “chain” instead of “store” to express that each supermarket chain has several outlets. 
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NECBENi = Non-economic benefits from loyalty program memberships perceived by household i; 
PRIVi = Privacy concerns w.r.t. loyalty program memberships by household i; 
GAZi  = Number of loyalty program memberships of gasoline stations held by household i, 
where i = 1, …, I; I = 1909 (households). 
A crucial requirement for the instrumental variables is that they are independent from 
the attraction to a specific grocery chain. Our four instrumental variables (economic & non-
economic benefits, privacy concerns, and the number of loyalty program memberships of 
gasoline stations) are formulated with respect to retailing in general, and therefore not related 
to any particular grocery chain. By this operationalization, we ensure that we only use 
exogenous variation in loyalty membership rates, i.e., variation that is not related to store 
attraction. The exogenous variation allows us to estimate the effect of loyalty programs on 
behavioral loyalty unbiasedly and consistently (Wooldridge p. 568). The four instruments 
seem to be strong as well, since their correlations with the loyalty program membership 
variable (LP) are all significant at the 1-% level (see Table 3, below the diagonal). 
Specifically, the correlation between economic benefits and LP is .20, between non-economic 
benefits and LP is .08, between privacy concerns and LP the correlation is −.06, and between 
the number of loyalty program memberships of gasoline stations and LP it is .20. 
To capture the expected benefits from enrolling in loyalty programs in general, we 
include economic benefits (ECBEN) in the attraction model. We cannot include a variable 
such as “expected expenditures in a given chain” as an instrumental variable although it may 
be a key driver of the program membership decision. The issue is that such a variable is most 
likely to be very much correlated with the error term in the attraction equation, and therefore 
it is not a proper instrument. Hence in our model, the non chain-specific variable ECBEN 
subsumes expected expenditures.  
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Household characteristics 
Socio-demographic information is available on household size and net household 
income of panel members4. These socio-demographic variables are included in the model as 
moderators of the store variables and as main effects in the loyalty program membership 
equation (see Figure 1). We define the variables as: 
HHSIZEi = Number of persons in household i; 
HHINCi = Monthly net income in 1,000 Euros of household i. 
 
Store characteristics 
Some supermarket chains are exclusively located in a limited number of provinces, 
while others are available nationwide. We obtained the number of outlets of a supermarket 
chain in each of the twelve provinces of the Netherlands in 2000 from Elsevier Business 
Information. For each province, the distribution density is measured as the number of outlets 
of a supermarket chain divided by the number of outlets across all chains. This measure is 
applied to an individual household, based on its province of residence5.  
Furthermore, the supermarket chains have been rated on eight dimensions twice per 
year through well over 8000 exit interviews. We apply the average value of two half-yearly 
ratings to the yearly period. We conducted a factor analysis extracting two factors. After 
varimax rotation, the factors can be labeled as: price attractiveness and service level (see  
Appendix A2). In sum, we introduce the following set of store characteristics: 
DENSis =  Number of outlets of supermarket chain s as a fraction of the total number of 
supermarket outlets, in the province of residence of household i; 
                                                 
4 We also tested the inclusion of additional household characteristics in the model, such as the presence of young 
children in the household and the educational attainment of the housewife. Because none of the characteristics 
showed significant effects and theoretical arguments for them were not very strong, we dropped them from the 
final model.  
5 Since we do not have information about the residence of households at a more detailed level than province, we 
cannot calculate a more precise proximity measure such as the household’s distance to the closest outlet for each 
supermarket chain.  
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PRATTRs = The extent to which supermarket chain s has attractive prices; 
SERVs = The service level of supermarket chain s, 
where s = 1,…, S; S = 20 (supermarket chains). 
Loyalty program membership and design 
We know the loyalty program memberships of all households in each of the seven 
loyalty programs for both observation moments (January 1999 and January 2000): 
LPis = 1, if household i is member of the loyalty program of supermarket chain s; 0 
otherwise. 
We also use information on loyalty program design: the saving rate and the discount 
rate. The saving rate is calculated as the monetary value a consumer saves per euro spent 
(Liston-Heyes, 2002). We base the saving rate on the monetary value of the gifts and free 
products participants could save for, which we obtained from web sites and from 
communication with loyalty program managers. The discount rate is based on Dutch 
Consumer Reports (2000), which measured the discount rate of the loyalty programs by 
taking a sample of loyalty program members’ receipts and calculating the average discount 
percentage obtained per loyalty program. In sum, the following loyalty program design 
variables are used: 
SAVs =  Saving rate offered by the loyalty program of supermarket chain s; 
DISCs = Discount rate offered by the loyalty program of supermarket chain s.  
Share-of-Wallet 
We measure purchase behavior as the share-of-wallet in a supermarket chain in a 
specific year, as defined by the following variable:  
SOWis = Share-of-wallet of household i in chain s. 
We use one observation moment (one cross-section of 1909 households) for model 
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estimation. The share-of-wallet data are taken from one year of purchases symmetrically 
surrounding January 1999, the month in which the first questionnaire was administered. We 
aggregate the purchase data over a yearly period since our independent variables (in particular 
program membership) do not vary at a more frequent rate. We use also one observation 
moment for model validation (January 2000). In particular, we use the model to predict 
changes in the share-of-wallet for those households who enter or quit a loyalty program 
between January 1999 and January 2000. We model share-of-wallet via the attraction of each 
supermarket chain, as we discuss next. 
 
MODEL 
A model for share-of-wallet yields specific challenges. To be logically consistent, the 
model must produce estimates between 0 and 1 (range constraint), and the sum of estimates 
over all stores must equal 1 (sum constraint) (Hanssens, Parsons, & Schultz 2001, p.121). 
Attraction models meet these constraints, and have been widely used for modeling market 
shares (Leeflang, Wittink, Wedel, & Naert, 2000, p.171). An attraction model can also be 
applied to household-level shares-of-wallet: the basic idea is that the share-of-wallet of a store 
depends on its relative attraction to a consumer: 
(1) 
∑
=
= S
s
is
is
is
A
ASOW
1
. 
The attraction of a store (Ais) is a function of loyalty program membership and store 
characteristics6. We specify the attraction function as a Multi Nominal Logit Model, so that it 
becomes: 
                                                 
6 Household characteristics show up exactly in the same manner in the nominator and the denominator of the 
model, and cancel out in the equation for share-of-wallet. Hence in model (2) household characteristics only 
appear in interaction with store characteristics. We prefer this approach over interactions with store dummies, 
since it is more parsimonious and the interpretation is more clear. In the equations for store choice and loyalty 
program membership the household characteristics are included as main effects. 
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The correlation table for the variables included in the model can be found in Table 3, above 
the diagonal; all correlations are .58 or less in absolute value. Each of the interaction variables 
in equation (2) has been obtained by mean-centering the original 
variables: )(*)( 2211 XXXX −− , where the bar represents the sample mean. While this 
transformation does not affect the overall multicollinearity in the model, it does allow us to 
interpret the main effects to hold for an average observation (Gatignon and Vosgerau 2006). 
The interaction terms that include household size (HHSIZE) and income (HHINC) capture 
observed household heterogeneity.7 They show how a household’s deviation from the average 
size or income influences the value of the store characteristic for evaluating store attraction. 
For stores that do not have a loyalty program, we exclude the terms with LP from the 
attraction specification (2). 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The model accounts for the fact that households differ in the number of stores they 
visit, because the share-of-wallet of a household is modeled as the attraction of the specific 
store divided by the sum of the attractions of the stores chosen by this particular household. In 
this way we also account for competitive loyalty programs, because these enhance the 
attraction of the competition. 
The attraction model is non-linear, and must be transformed to enable estimation of 
the parameter coefficients. Using the method of log-centering (Nakanishi & Cooper, 1982), 
we obtain a log-linear specification from which we can estimate the parameter coefficients:  
                                                 
7 Since we only have one observation per household, we cannot accommodate unobserved heterogeneity. 
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 One issue with (2) is that shares-of-wallet are zero in case a household does not 
patronize a specific chain during an entire year. An attraction model does not allow for these 
zeros, because the attraction of a supermarket chain cannot be zero (see equation (2)). 
Analyzing only those observations with a positive share-of-wallet may lead to biased 
parameters. That is, share-of-wallet is positive conditional on the store being chosen, and we 
expect that unobserved factors that influence a household’s store choice influence the share-
of-wallet of chosen stores as well. Therefore, the error terms of both models are possibly 
correlated, and we should account for this dependency to obtain unbiased and consistent 
parameter estimates (Thomas, 2001). Another issue with (2) is the potential endogeneity of 
loyalty program membership, as discussed before. To solve both issues, we follow the 
procedure for type-II Tobit models with endogenous variables as recently proposed by 
Wooldridge (2002, p.567-571).  
For model estimation purposes, we introduce a selection variable CHOICEis, which 
indicates whether store s is in the choice set of household i. We assume that a consumer 
chooses to visit a supermarket chain (CHOICEis=1) if the underlying utility *isCHOICE  is 
positive. *isCHOICE  is linearly dependent on a set of independent variables X2is. This set 
consists of the same store and household characteristics as in the attraction function (2). The 
loyalty program design elements (SAVs and DISCs) and instrumental variables are included as 
well. Store choice is captured by a probit model with pooled coefficients across stores, which 
allows for the fact that a household may visit multiple stores, i.e., multiple elements of 
{CHOICEi1,…,CHOICEiS) can be equal to one. For each store the probit model yields the 
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inverse Mill’s ratio, λis, which is calculated as follows: 
(4) 
)'(
)'(
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is
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X
Φ= , where η is the vector of parameters from the choice model. 
This λis is added, for each chain, as an independent variable to (2) to correct for the 
interrelation between store choice and share-of-wallet.  
 The 2SLS procedure requires to predict loyalty program membership by the 
instrumental variables (ECBENi, NECBENi,, PRIVi, and GAZi) and by all independent 
variables from the share-of-wallet model (Wooldridge 2002, p. 569). We do exclude the four 
instruments from the share-of-wallet equation, and thus we meet the identification 
requirement (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 569). Because the membership decision only takes place in 
case a loyalty program is available to the consumer, we estimate this equation only for the 
seven chains with a loyalty program and for those consumers that have chosen the store 
(CHOICEis=1). The loyalty program membership equation is:  
(5)  
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where we again applied mean-centering to compute the interaction terms. The correlation 
table for the variables included in the model can be found in Table 3, below the diagonal. As 
we indicated before, the correlations between the instrumental variables and loyalty program 
membership are all significant at 1-% level. Furthermore, the instrumental variables are hardly 
correlated with each other (all correlations below .2 in absolute value), which implies that 
each of the instruments explains a complementary part of the loyalty program membership 
decision. 
Although loyalty program membership is a binary variable, we use linear regression, 
since the 2SLS estimation procedure “applies to any kind of endogenous variable, including 
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binary and other discrete variables” (Wooldridge, 2002, p.569).8 The 2SLS procedure requires 
us to replace LPis by the prediction from model (5), isPLˆ , in equation (2) for SOWis.  
With respect to the moderating effects, Gatignon and Vosgerau (2006) suggest a two-
step estimation procedure of models that contain product terms. The first step is to estimate 
the complete model with  all main and moderating effects. In the second step a final model is 
estimated that leaves out the insignificant moderating effects. We follow this approach for 
each of the three model components (choice, loyalty program membership, and share-of-
wallet).   
 
RESULTS 
As a first step, we estimate the choice model over all observations, and obtain the 
inverse Mill’s ratio λis needed in the succeeding steps. The complete model reveals that none 
of the moderating effects between household characteristics and store variables is significant. 
Therefore we continue with a choice model without these moderators. This model is 
significant (p < .01) with LL= −7285.0 and pseudo-R2 =.248. Since the store choice equation 
is merely included to obtain unbiased estimates for the share-of-wallet equation, we will not 
further discuss it. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
In the second step, we estimate the model for the loyalty program membership 
decision (5). Table 4 presents both the complete model (left-hand side), and the final model 
after deletion of the insignificant moderating effects (right-hand side). Following Gatignon 
and Vosgerau (2006), we focus on the latter version of the model. The model fit is highly 
significant )01. ,97.40)1909,14(( <= pF , and the R2 = .170. Each of the four instrumental 
variables is significant and predicts loyalty program membership in the expected way. First, 
                                                 
8 Since a binomial choice model is more common for a binary dependent variable, we also estimated a probit 
model for LPis . The results are highly similar to those of the regression model.  
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perceived economic program benefits positively affect loyalty program 
membership )01. ,075.ˆ( 1 <= pα , and the same applies for non-economic benefits 
)01. ,039.ˆ( 2 <= pα . Next, privacy concerns have a negative effect )05. ,018.ˆ( 3 <−= pα , 
implying that privacy concerns indeed withhold customers from participation in loyalty 
programs. Finally, the number of gasoline loyalty program memberships hold relates 
positively to the membership decision in the supermarket industry )01. ,069.ˆ( 4 <= pα . We 
also find that both higher saving )01. ,061.ˆ( 5 <= pα  and discount rates )01. ,031.ˆ( 6 <= pα  
stimulate households to enroll. The saving rate effect is significantly larger than the discount 
rate effect though ( 05.;05.2;030.ˆˆ 65 <==− ptαα ). 
In the final step, we include the predicted loyalty program membership from (5) in the 
attraction model (2), and estimate it conditional on CHOICEis =1. Again, we first estimate the 
complete model, and then continue with a model that leaves out the insignificant moderating 
effects. We base our conclusions on the latter version of the model. The attraction model is 
overall highly significant ( 01.,49.17)5260,8( <= pF ) with a model fit R2 = .047. The 
parameter estimates of the model are reported in Table 5.9 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
We find that loyalty program membership influences store attraction 
positively )01. ,410.ˆ( 1 <= pβ . The Mills ratio is insignificant, which shows that the error 
terms of the choice and attraction models are independent. There are no significant 
moderating effects of saving and discount rates on the impact of loyalty program membership 
on share-of-wallet. Combined with our findings on the membership decision, we conclude 
that higher reward rates mainly stimulate customers to participate in the loyalty program, but 
                                                 
9 We note that 2SLS procedure requires including in the SOW model independent variables that are also used 
(together with the instruments) to compute the predicted LP, which is used in the SOW model as well. We 
investigated whether this has led to multicollinearity. All VIF-values of the share-of-wallet equation are smaller 
than 5.4 and the condition index is 12.3. Since these statistics are well below commonly accepted standards 
(Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006, p. 226-230), we conclude there is no multicollinearity problem. 
 23
do not affect the behavioral loyalty of customers once they are enrolled as members. Both 
socio-demographic variables, household size and income, do not significantly alter the loyalty 
program effect either.  
The store characteristics distribution density and price attractiveness both lead to a 
higher share-of-wallet. Service level does not have a significant effect. For the socio-
demographic moderators, we find that only household size significantly influences the effect 
of distribution density and price attractiveness on attraction. In particular, household size has 
a negative moderating impact on distribution density and a positive moderating impact on 
price attractiveness. The interpretation of these moderating effects can be illustrated as 
follows (Gatignon and Vosgerau 2006). For a household with an average size (2.55 members, 
equal to the sample mean) the effect of distribution intensity on attraction is 4.87 and the 
effect of price attractiveness is .36 (i.e., these are the main effects). For a relatively large 
household that consists of four members (the sample 75%-quartile), the effect of distribution 
intensity is weaker: 3.08 (=4.87 +1.45*−.90), and the effect of price attractiveness is stronger: 
.46 (=.36 +1.45*.07). These findings are consistent with the prediction that distance matters 
less for households with larger basket sizes, and that price matters more (Bell & Lattin, 1998).  
Conversely, for a relatively small household of two members (the sample 25%-quartile), the 
effect of distribution intensity is stronger: 4.88 (=4.87 −.55*−.90), and the effect of price 
attractiveness is weaker: .32 (=.36 −.55*.07). This illustration shows that the coefficients of 
the store variables distribution density and price attractiveness can only be interpreted as the 
effect of the store variable at a specific variable of the variable household size (moderator 
variable). 
 
Effect size and profitability 
The magnitude of the effects is not directly apparent from the parameter estimates, due 
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to the non-linear nature of the model. In addition, the coefficients represent the effects of 
variables on attraction and not on share-of-wallet. To gain better insight into loyalty program 
effects, we perform effect size calculations, for each supermarket in turn10. Table 6 reports the 
average predicted change in share-of-wallet due to becoming a member of the focal chain’s 
program (keeping everything else constant). Note that we compute the average across all 
households in the database. Hence the analysis includes customers who are loyalty program 
members, customers who are member of competing programs, and customers who are not 
loyalty program members at any chain. Table 6 shows that the loyalty program for all 
supermarket chains enhances average share-of-wallet across all seven loyalty programs by 4.1 
percentage points. There are some differences between loyalty programs, with effect sizes 
varying between 2.3 and 5.7 percentage points. 
[Insert Table 6 about there] 
We also calculate whether loyalty programs generate additional customer revenues 
(Table 6). Additional revenues depend on the loyalty program effect on share-of-wallet, but 
also on customers’ total supermarket expenditures. We calculate the additional revenues from 
a household due to being a program member as the predicted increase in its share-of-wallet 
times its total supermarket expenditures. On average, a loyalty program membership yields 
€ 240 additional revenue per customer per year, but again differences exist between 
supermarket chains (see Table 6). Overall, loyalty programs that are effective in terms of 
share-of-wallet show large revenue effects as well -- but some deviations exist. In particular, 
the loyalty program of Albert Heijn generates relatively high additional revenues (€ 328), 
because the customers of that chain have supermarket expenditures that are higher than 
average. 
                                                 
10 The procedure described here only provides insight in the effect size and not in the effect of abolishing a 
loyalty program. Abolishing a loyalty program may lead to strong negative reactions from customers and can 
trigger competitive reactions as well.  
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Additional revenues come at a cost: discount and saving rewards. The reward rate is 
the sum of the discount rate and the saving rate. We calculate the total reward costs as the 
reward rate times the yearly expenditures per loyalty program member, separately for each 
chain.11 Table 6 provides the average yearly reward costs of the customers per supermarket 
chain. The net revenue effects, calculated as the difference between the average additional 
revenues minus the rewarding costs, show results that vary strongly across programs (far 
right-hand column of Table 6). On average, a loyalty program enhances the net yearly 
revenues of a customer by € 163, but the effects vary between € 91 and € 236.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Loyalty program effectiveness depends on the number of other loyalty programs a 
customer is enrolled in. To illustrate this, Table 7 shows the effect size calculations by the 
number of competitive loyalty program memberships. The effect of a loyalty program 
membership on share-of-wallet is largest for customers who do not hold any competitive 
memberships (.053). The effect decreases gradually with the number of competitive 
memberships. For example, for customers with four or more competitive loyalty program 
memberships the loyalty program effect (.024) is less than half than that for customers 
without competitive memberships. We elaborate on the implications in the discussion section. 
 
Model validation 
We argue that accounting for endogeneity problems is important in order to obtain an 
unbiased assessment of loyalty program effectiveness. To explore this, we compare our model 
with a naïve benchmark model that does not account for endogeneity. This benchmark model 
uses the observed loyalty program membership variable instead of the predictions from the 
loyalty program membership model. In the naïve model the loyalty program has a strong 
                                                 
11 This calculation assumes that the actual cost of the reward to the retailer is the same as the value of the reward 
to the consumer. Since the actual costs (that are unavailable to us) may be lower because retailers pay wholesale 
prices, net revenue effects may be somewhat understated. 
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positive influence on attraction )01.;421.3ˆ( 1 <= pβ , which is much stronger than the estimate 
for the model that treats the membership decision as endogenous )410.ˆ( 1 =β .  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
We used the estimates of the naïve model to compute the effect of membership on 
share-of-wallet. The naïve model predicts that a member has a share-of-wallet that is on 
average 29.8 percentage points higher than a non-member, which corresponds very closely to 
the average member- versus non-member difference in share-of-wallet based on the raw data 
(last column of Table 1). The effect size estimate from the naïve model that ignores 
endogeneity (29.8 percentage points) is on average more than seven times higher than the 
average estimate for the model that accounts for endogeneity (4.1 percentage point).  
To validate both models we assess to what extent both models can predict changes in 
shares-of-wallet for households that (dis)adopt a loyalty program membership. Since we 
estimate both models on cross-sectional variation only (remember that the estimation sample 
is a cross-section), predicting longitudinal within-household effects of changing loyalty 
membership represents a strong test of the validity of the estimates (Van Dijk, Van Heerde, 
Leeflang, and Wittink (2004) use the same approach).  
We select those household-store combinations that changed loyalty program 
memberships in the validation sample (January 2000) relative to the estimation sample 
(January 1999). To avoid truncation problems, we limit ourselves to those cases in which the 
household has been customer of the specific chain in both years (CHOICEis =1 for t =1,2). We 
have 263 household-store combinations in which the household adopted a new loyalty 
program, and 140 combinations in which the household disadopted a loyalty program. For 
these 403 cases we predict the change in share-of-wallet between the estimation and 
validation sample moments. We compare the actual change with the predicted change in 
share-of-wallet according from models with and without endogeneity correction by computing 
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the MSE (mean squared error) and MAPE (mean absolute percentage error) (Leeflang et al., 
2000, p.506). The model with endogeneity correction has an MSE =.014 and MAPE =35.9%, 
whereas the benchmark model achieves MSE =.254 and MAPE = 513.3%. Overall, we find 
that the model with endogeneity correction predicts the changes in share-of-wallet due to 
membership changes considerably better than the naïve benchmark model that does not 
accommodate endogeneity.  
DISCUSSION 
We studied the effects of seven loyalty programs on share-of-wallet using market-wide panel 
data on supermarket purchases. Our study is the first to account for the endogenous nature of 
loyalty program membership by specifying a model for the loyalty program decision and 
using instrumental variables such as the attitude towards loyalty programs in general. We find 
a significant positive yet small effect (4.1 percentage points) of loyalty program membership 
on share-of-wallet. This effect is seven times smaller than is suggested by a naïve model (29.8 
percentage points), which ignores endogeneity. We show that the predictive validity of the 
proposed model is much better than for the naïve model. In terms of profitability, we find that 
each program is able to generate more additional revenues than additional costs in terms of 
saving and discount rewards. 
Managerial implications 
The results of this study could help managers to improve their decisions concerning 
loyalty programs. A company (re)considering the use of such a program should realize that 
loyalty programs are generally effective in enhancing share-of-wallet, but that the effects are 
easily overstated. A company that runs a loyalty program should therefore closely monitor its 
effectiveness. Our results show that this is not trivial. Loyalty programs aim to enhance 
purchase behavior, but the company’s best customers are the most likely to subscribe as 
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members. This leads to endogeneity problems, which invalidate a simple comparison of 
purchase behavior of loyalty program members versus non-members (as in Table 1). Valid 
assessments can be obtained through a model that accounts for the fact that the membership 
decision is endogenous.  
Loyalty program members and non-members are substantially different in purchase 
behavior (Van Heerde & Bijmolt, 2005). However, the bad news for loyalty program 
managers is that our results suggest that self-selection is the primary driver of share-of-wallet 
differences between loyalty program members and non-members. We find that the effect of 
membership on share-of-wallet is seven times larger for a model without than a model with 
endogeneity. Put differently, 86% of the effect of being a member on share-of-wallet vanishes 
if we account for the endogenous nature of the membership decision. Self-selecting members 
are already loyal to the store, and enrolling in the loyalty program allows them to reap saving 
and discount rewards without becoming more loyal. The good news is that the remaining 14% 
of the effect is due to exogenously driven variation in loyalty program membership, i.e., due 
to factors that are unrelated to store loyalty. Our message is that if a manager succeeds in 
creating loyalty program membership based on these "exogenous factors", the loyalty 
program can increase shares-of-wallet significantly. We elaborate on this now. 
A first suggestion to create "exogenous" loyalty program membership is to pay careful 
attention to loyalty program design, because it has a significant impact on the likelihood of 
signing up for the program. This implies that it is useful to clearly communicate the financial 
benefits to non-members, which are either delayed or direct rewards. Delayed rewards are 
rear-loaded incentives and they are compatible with the main purpose of loyalty programs to 
increase long-term loyalty and retention (Taylor & Neslin, 2005), whereas direct rewards 
(single-shot price discounts) are front-loaded incentives that seem incompatible with long-
term program goals (see also Zhang et al., 2000). When focusing on the trade-off between 
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direct and delayed rewards, managers are advised to reward customers predominantly via 
delayed rewards, such as a saving feature, since the impact on the enrollment decision is 
stronger than for direct discounts. This finding suggests that consumers act irrationally, 
because (ceteris paribus) direct discounts do not create switching costs whereas delayed 
rewards do. The finding that consumers overvalue the benefits of saving is consistent with lab 
results (Hsee et al., 2003; Van Osselaer et al., 2003). 
Offering higher saving (and discount) rates costs money though. Our analyses show 
that the program that generates the highest net revenues per customer is Albert Heijn. Its 
saving rate (1%) and discount rates (4%) are quite close to the average across programs. This 
chain appears to find the right balance between offering rewards that entice consumers to 
enroll, but that do not cost too much. A chain that does not find the right balance is Jan 
Linders. It offers the lowest saving reward rate and the highest discount rate across all 
programs, which is just the opposite from what leads to high participation rates according to 
our model (Table 2). Moreover, this loyalty program incurs so many reward costs that net 
revenues are barely positive (Table 6). 
To increase participation rates it is also important to consider the profile of consumers 
that are likely to sign up for a loyalty program. Our results suggest that a key characteristic is 
a positive attitude towards loyalty programs in general. We find that there are two 
components of this attitude: perceived economic and non-economic benefits (Table 4). 
Obviously, managers may enhance the perceived economic benefits by communicating the 
attractive discounts and saving rewards that participation brings. Alternatively, they may 
stress the benefits that a consumer foregoes by shopping at a retailer that does not offer a 
loyalty program, since this is the variable that also loads highly on the factor economic 
benefits (Table A.1). To enhance the perceived non-economic benefits, managers may stress 
the joy and connectedness that the program brings, which could even be more important than 
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low prices (Table A.1). Furthermore, managers could search for original, entertaining and 
joyful “soft benefits” that are cost efficient but enhance the non-economic benefits customers 
derive from the program.     
A factor that inhibits loyalty program participation are privacy concerns (Table 4). 
Current privacy legislation protects customer privacy to a great extent, and some of their fears 
might be irrational. In order to reduce customers’ privacy fears, a retail company should 
invest in proper communication to customers about privacy protection guarantees and the 
constraints on data usage, and of course, act accordingly (Phelps et al., 2000).  
Interestingly, we find that once a consumer has decided to enroll in a particular 
program, the effect of membership on share-of-wallet is independent of the saving rate and 
discount rate. A possible explanation is that once a consumer participates in a particular 
program, s/he becomes more loyal to that chain (significant main effect of LP on attraction), 
and therefore differences in reward rates across programs are less salient and actionable. 
Moreover, we also find that household size does not significantly moderate the loyalty 
program effect. This implies that once a household has enrolled, larger households do not 
increase their share more than smaller households. However, since total grocery expenditures 
are higher for larger households, absolute increases in expenditures due to loyalty program 
membership are higher than for smaller households. The same applies for richer versus poorer 
households.  
The effect of a loyalty program decreases with the number of competitive loyalty 
program memberships. Retailers should therefore focus on attracting customers with a low 
number of program memberships. A design that rewards loyalty progressively (i.e., reward 
tiers such as silver and golden members) may withhold customers of holding many loyalty 
program memberships.  
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Limitations and further research  
We undertook a market-wide study of all loyalty programs in the Dutch supermarket 
industry and found overall positive effects of programs on share-of-wallet. Given that the 
relationship proneness and product category involvement of consumers is low in this industry, 
we could expect these effects to be even larger in other industries, such as clothing retailing 
(De Wulf et al., 2001). Furthermore, in the empirical application several competitors use 
loyalty programs, and households hold several loyalty program members simultaneously. As a 
consequence, an individual retailer derives only limited competitive advantage from the 
loyalty program. Consumers can optimize their loyalty program benefits by ‘cherry-picking’ 
among the several loyalty programs. The qualitative results of our study may not generalize to 
situations in which only one retailer has a loyalty program. The empirical findings of Drèze 
and Hoch (1998) suggest that the effectiveness of a loyalty program is stronger under these 
circumstances.  
Further, the loyalty program designs studied in this paper offer linear reward 
structures, do not distinguish between customer tiers (e.g., silver, gold and diamond 
members), and charge no membership fees. In that sense the relatively low effects on loyalty 
that we find provide perhaps a lower bound of the effect a loyalty program may generate. 
Companies could potentially gain from differentiating their loyalty programs from other 
programs. One particularly interesting direction of further empirical investigation is whether it 
is beneficial to the firm to offer convex saving point schedules (Nunes & Drèze 2006), i.e., 
rewards that increase with the number of points saved in the (recent) past. Another option is a 
multi-tier program where every tier brings additional benefits. Such programs are often seen 
in frequent flyer programs (Von Wangenheim & Bayón, 2006), but are less common in 
retailing (Nunes & Drèze 2006). Related to this is the issue of membership fees. Where 
membership fees may withhold some customers from participation, it may select the more 
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profitable customers and be more effective in enhancing members’ loyalty (Dick and Lord 
1998). Managers could use field experiments in test markets to measure customer reactions to 
such refinements (see Drèze & Hoch (1998) for an interesting example).  
Further, share-of-wallet is a behavioral loyalty measure, and the development of 
attitudinal loyalty is also relevant (Yi & Jeon, 2003). Behavioral loyalty not supported by 
attitudinal loyalty is spurious (Dick & Basu, 1994), in the sense that it can easily be attacked 
by competitors. More research is needed on the extent to which attitudinal versus behavioral 
loyalty is enhanced by loyalty programs. Also of interest is the question to what extent the 
various drivers (economic, psychological, and social) play a mediating role in forming 
behavioral loyalty. In particular, it would be interesting to study the proposed dimensions of 
belonging, identification or reciprocity (as suggested by Bhattacharya & Sen, 2003). A fruitful 
extension to current research on these issues would be an examination of how customers deal 
with multiple memberships. How do positive attitudes towards a company develop if several 
companies provide loyalty benefits at the same time? More research is required as well on the 
effects of social benefits (e.g. special shopping nights or newsletters for members) on 
affective commitment and behavioral loyalty (Bolton, Lemon, & Verhoef, 2004). 
Our model, as any model, is incomplete. One limitation is that our model for loyalty 
program membership does not capture the entire variance to join the loyalty program. 
However, we note that the 2SLS estimator is consistent even when we do not have perfect fit 
in the membership equation (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 568). The intuition behind this is that the 
endogenous part of the variation in membership is explained by the independent variables that 
are also used to explain share-of-wallet. The exogenous part is explained by the four 
instrumental variables, which are all significant. By using predicted program membership 
("LP-hat") in the share-of-wallet model together with the independent variables, the parameter 
estimate for "LP-hat" is based on its exogenous variation only. 
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Our reduced-form 2SLS approach is not the only approach to measure the 
effectiveness of loyalty programs while accounting for endogeneity. Other useful approaches 
include switching regression models (Taylor & Neslin, 2005) and structural models that 
capture the optimizing behavior of consumers (Lewis, 2004; Erdem & Keane, 1996; Gönül & 
Srinivasan, 1996). Alternatively, we could use time series analysis in case a loyalty program 
is introduced within the observation period (which is not the case for our data). Customers 
could be tracked over time to check whether their behavioral loyalty increases due to the 
newly introduced program (Drèze & Hoch, 1998). Another approach is to find comparable 
units to filter out a common unobservable (Chamberlain & Griliches, 1975). One could match 
member customers with non-member customers based on e.g., demographics, and attribute 
differences in purchase behavior to the loyalty program. 
Since we use an attraction model for share-of-wallet, we account for the structural 
interdependence of the share-of-wallets of a household between different stores. However, 
one model limitation is that we do not allow for between-store error correlations within the 
various model components (loyalty program membership, chain choice, and share-of-wallet). 
This choice may affect the asymptotic efficiency of our estimates. However, we decided to 
treat the errors between stores as independent, because this allows us to use the univariate 
Tobit-II model with endogenous regressors proposed by Wooldridge (2002, p. 568), 
separately for each store. The consistency of the 2SLS estimator has been demonstrated for 
this model (Wooldridge 2002, p. 568). Unfortunately, the literature does not provide us yet 
with a multivariate Tobit-II model with endogenous regressors. Wooldridge (2002, p. 570) 
argues that maximum likelihood estimation for such a model is very complex and less robust 
than his 2SLS procedure. Since our key objective is to correct for endogeneity, we opt for a 
well-documented and consistent 2SLS approach for a univariate Tobit II model.  
We focus on share-of-wallet as our dependent variable, but loyalty programs might 
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also affect total category expenditures. In fact, Kopalle and Neslin (2003) find that the 
elasticity of category demand can be one of the drivers of loyalty program success. This topic 
is definitely worth further empirical study. We believe that the issue of category elasticity is 
especially relevant for shopping goods (such as apparel), and less relevant for grocery 
products that are the topic of this study. 
Another limitation of our study is that we were not able to incorporate all costs related 
to the loyalty program. We studied the profitability of loyalty programs by measuring the 
effects on purchase behavior versus the rewarding costs. However, a loyalty program also 
incorporates maintenance costs, such as operation of data warehouses, administration of 
rewards, logistics of rewards availability in the stores, etc. We had no access to estimates of 
such costs, which might diminish the profitability of the loyalty programs even further. On the 
other hand, we assumed that all saving points were redeemed, which is usually not the case 
(Drèze & Hoch, 1998). Overall, our benefit-cost comparison reveals to what extent additional 
revenues compensate the maximal additional rewards given to the customer.  
 Some additional benefits may be derived from the loyalty program as well. Our study 
focused on loyalty programs as a means of improving loyal behavior, but did not consider that 
a company might be motivated to introduce a loyalty program in order to obtain purchase data 
(Day, 2000; Leenheer & Bijmolt, 2003; Mauri, 2003). A loyalty program provides the 
company with full information of customers’ purchase behavior, and could be enriched with 
socio-demographics and causal information such as price promotions. Rossi, McCulloch, and 
Allenby (1996) show the value of using this information for target marketing to certain 
customer groups. Such a strategy of direct marketing fulfills customer needs more 
specifically, so that marketing budgets are spent more efficiently.  
Overall, our research shows that loyalty programs have significant positive yet small 
effects on share of wallet. The effects are strongly overestimated, however, if the endogenous 
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nature of the membership decision is ignored. We hope that this paper sheds new light on the 
question whether loyalty programs are really effective, and that it will stimulate additional 
research on this intriguing issue. 
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FIGURE 1 
Conceptual Framework for the Antecedents and Consequences of Loyalty Programs (LP) 
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FIGURE 2 
Changes in Share-of-Wallet Due to Loyalty Program Membership 
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TABLE 1 
Information on Supermarket Chains with a Loyalty Program (LP) 
 
 LP Saving  
Rate (SAV) 
LP Discount Rate 
(DISC)
Market 
Share
%
Market Share
Rank
# Chains 
Visited by
Customers 
% Loyalty 
Program Members
SOW 
LP 
members
SOW 
Non-LP 
members
Difference SOW 
LP/Non-LP members
Albert Heijn 
Super de Boer 
Edah 
Integro 
Konmar 
COOP 
Jan Linders 
Average 
1.0% 
.5% 
2.0% 
.6% 
.8% 
4.0% 
.5% 
1.3% 
4%
0%
5%
2%
5%
3%
9%
4%
24%
9%
8%
7%
3%
1%
1%
1
3
4
6
9
17
18
4.56
5.04
5.07
5.18
5.53
4.95
5.08
5.06
82%
59%
75%
49%
47%
72%
63%
64%
 .37
.32
.30
.44
.33
.35
.37
.36
.13
.11
.02
.07
.03
.01
.09
.07
.24
.21
.28
.37
.30
.34
.28
.29
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TABLE 2 
Data Sources 
 
Source Obtained data 
GfK Panel Services 1998-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dutch Consumer Reports 2000 
 
 
GfK Christmas/Summer report 
 
 
Elsevier Business Information 2000 
 
 
Purchase behavior of Dutch households in 
supermarkets, loyalty program memberships, 
perceived economic and non-economic 
benefits of loyalty programs, privacy 
concerns, and socio-demographics of the 
households 
 
Discount rate of Dutch supermarket loyalty 
programs 
 
Scores on store characteristics for twenty 
largest Dutch supermarket chains. 
 
Outlet locations of Dutch supermarket chains  
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TABLE 3 
Correlations for all observations (above diagonal) and for chains with loyalty programs only (below diagonal).a 
  SOW LPb SAVc DISCc DENS PRATT SERV HHSIZE HHINC ECBEN NECBEN PRIV GAZ 
Share-of-Wallet SOW 1 .35**   .19** −.09** .12** −.01 −.01 −.05** .04* −.01 −.07** 
LP membership  LPb .58** 1   .39** −.56** .38* .03* .04** .08** .15** −.02 .11** 
Saving rate % SAVc −.01 .19** 1           
Discount rate % DISCc .03 .10** .49** 1          
Distribution Density DENS .16** .23** −.08** −.01 1 −.58** .25** .00 .01 −.01 .03 −.01 .01 
Price attractiveness PRATTR −.10** −.22** .42** .39** −.72** 1 −.40** .01 −.03* −.03* −.03* .00 −.03 
Service level SERV .08** .03 −.59** .04* .27** −.41** 1 −.01 .03* .03* .02 −.00 −.01 
Household size HHSIZE  −.01 .02 .05* .01 −.02 .03 −.06** 1 .02 .02 −.01 −.07** .15** 
Household income HHINC .02 .03 .01 .00 .02 −.02 .03 .03 1 .07** −.07** −.06** .14** 
Economic benefits ECBEN .08** .20** .02 .07** −.03 .05** .03 .02 .07** 1 .00 −.02 .19** 
Non-economic benefits NECBEN .15** .08** .04* .01 −.03 .02 −.03 −.02 −.08** −.03 1 −.06** .05** 
Privacy concerns PRIV −.03 −.06** .01 .02 −.01 .01 .01 −.06** −.07** −.04 −.06** 1 −.11** 
# LPs gasoline sector GAZ −.03 .20** −.05** −.07** −.01 −.04 −.02 .14** .13** .18** .03 −.12** 1 
               
** Significant at .01 level; * Significant at .05 level 
a  The above-diagonal correlations are relevant for the SOW and Choice models, whereas the below-diagonal correlations are relevant for the LP model. 
b  Since the variable LP is binary, the numbers in this column/row refer to Spearman’s rho.  
c  Since the saving (SAV) and discount rate (DISC) are only measured conditional on the chain having a loyalty program, the correlations for these variables can be reported for  
these chains only (therefore, only correlations for these variables are presented in the area below the diagonal).   
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TABLE 4 
Results of the Loyalty Program Membership Model 
 
  Initial model:  
all moderators 
Final model:  
only significant moderators 
Independent Variable  Parameter 
Estimate 
t-Value Parameter 
Estimate 
t-Value 
Constant 
Economic benefits (ECBEN) 
Non-economic benefits (NECBEN) 
Privacy concerns (PRIV) 
# LPs gasoline sector (GAZ) 
Saving rate % (SAV) 
Discount rate % (DISC) 
Household size (HHSIZE) 
Household income (HHINC) 
Distribution density (DENS) 
Price attractiveness (PRATTR) 
Service level (SERV) 
DENS*HHSIZE 
DENS*HHINC 
PRATTR* HHSIZE 
PRATTR*HHINC 
SERV*HHSIZE 
SERV*HHINC 
Mills ratio (λ) 
α0 
α1 
α2 
α3 
α4 
α5 
α6 
α7 
α8 
α9 
α10 
α11 
α12 
α13 
α14 
α15 
α16 
α17 
α18 
.835 
.076 
.038 
−.017 
.070 
.062 
.031 
.002 
−.040 
−.003 
−.061 
−.023 
.079 
.006 
.007 
−.016 
−.009 
.032 
−.185 
4.88*** 
8.91*** 
4.67*** 
−2.65** 
7.18*** 
3.12*** 
5.24*** 
.18 
−2.96*** 
−.54 
−2.65*** 
−.59 
.84 
.05 
.70 
−1.36 
−.67 
1.98** 
−2.00** 
.896 
.075 
.039 
−.018 
.069 
.061 
.031 
.002 
−.027 
−.005 
−.057 
−.017 
 
 
 
 
 
.044 
−.218 
5.32*** 
8.81*** 
4.75*** 
−2.12** 
7.07*** 
3.07*** 
5.25*** 
.34 
−2.81*** 
−.89 
−2.49*** 
−.44 
 
 
 
 
 
2.12*** 
−2.40** 
  
R2 
 
.171 
  
.170 
 
 
*** p<.01 ** p<.05 * p<.10 (two-sided tests) 
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TABLE 5 
Results of the Attraction model for Share-of-Wallet 
 
  Initial model: 
all moderators 
 Final model: 
only significant moderators
Independent Variable: 
 Parameter 
Estimate 
t-Value  Parameter 
Estimate 
t-Value 
Constant 
LP 
LP*SAV 
LP*DISC 
LP*HHSIZE 
LP*HHINC 
 
β0 
β1 
β2 
β3 
β4 
β5 
 
.049 
.431 
.014 
−.030 
−.000 
−.023 
.45 
3.81*** 
.40 
−.30 
−.17 
−.96 
 
 .056 
.410 
 
.52 
3.69*** 
Distribution Density (DENS) 
Price Attractiveness (PRATTR) 
Service Level (SERV) 
DENS*HHSIZE 
DENS*HHINC 
PRATTR * HHSIZE 
PRATTR *HHINC 
SERV*HHSIZE 
SERV*HHINC 
Mills ratio (λ) 
β6    
β7    
β8    
β9    
β10    
β11   
β12   
β13  
β14   
 
  4.857 
    .414 
−.035 
−.869 
  .157 
    .072 
−.046 
−.003 
−.157 
−.049 
5.52*** 
8.54*** 
−1.12 
−2.74*** 
.40 
2.58** 
−1.25 
−.17 
−.96 
−.47 
 4.867 
.364 
−.019 
−.899 
 
.071 
 
 
 
−.047 
5.63*** 
8.26*** 
−.63 
−2.93*** 
 
2.98*** 
 
 
 
−.53 
R2    .048   .047  
*** p<.01 ** p<.05 * p<.10 (two-sided tests). 
 44
TABLE 6 
Changes in Per-Customer Share-of-Wallet and (Net) Revenues Due to Program Membership 
 
 
Supermarket 
Chain 
 
Δ SOW* 
 
Δ Revenues** 
 
Δ Costs** 
 
Δ Net Revenues** 
Albert Heijn 
Super de Boer 
Edah 
Integro 
Konmar 
COOP 
Jan Linders 
Average 
.057 
.034 
.056 
.030 
.023 
.041 
.046 
.041 
€ 
€ 
€ 
€ 
€ 
€ 
€ 
€
328.72 
196.35 
311.72 
181.02 
151.38 
249.36 
259.46 
239.72 
€ 
€ 
€ 
€ 
€ 
€ 
€ 
€ 
92.37 
6.06 
88.34 
38.01 
60.53 
105.90 
147.16 
76.91 
€
€
€
€
€
€
€
€
236.35 
190.29 
223.38 
143.01 
90.85 
143.46 
112.30 
162.81 
*   Average predicted change in share-of-wallet due to becoming a member of the focal chain’s program (keeping everything else constant). 
**  Average predicted change in Euros per year   
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TABLE 7 
Changes in Per-Customer Share-of-Wallet Due to Program Membership: 
The Influence of Competitive Loyalty Program Memberships 
 
Number of competitive 
LP-memberships 
Δ SOW* 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 or more 
.053 
.048 
.039 
.033 
.024 
* Average predicted change in share-of-wallet due to becoming a member 
of the focal chain’s program (keeping everything else constant). 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A.1 
Attitudes towards Loyalty Programs by Panel Households 
Rotated Factor Loadings (Varimax)  Mean S.d. 
Non-
economic 
Benefits
(NECBEN)
Economic 
Benefits
(ECBEN)
Non-
economic 
Costs
 (PRIV)
I feel stronger connected to a retailer of which I hold a loyalty card. 
Having a loyalty card makes me feel like a regular customer.  
I prefer loyalty programs over lower prices. 
I enjoy participation in loyalty or saving programs. 
If a retailer does not have a loyalty program, I miss important benefits. 
Loyalty and saving programs offer attractive benefits. 
I am paying more attention on special offers because of the loyalty card. 
The registration systems of loyalty programs infringe on my privacy. 
2.59 
2.79 
2.42 
3.06 
3.13 
3.40 
3.06 
2.91 
.991 
.964 
.907 
1.055 
1.064 
.912 
1.153 
.960 
.848 
.790 
.784 
.649 
.134 
.369 
.451 
–.101 
.230 
.306 
.175 
.403 
.886 
.769 
.635 
–.048 
–.144 
–.089 
.051 
–.262 
.006 
–.119 
–.039 
.978 
* All items are measured on a 5-point scale (1=totally disagree, 5=totally agree). 
 
TABLE A.2 
Factor Analysis on the Ratings of Supermarket Chains on Store Dimensions 
Rotated Factor Loadings (Varimax)  Mean  S.d. 
Service Level  
      (SERV) 
Price Attractiveness 
     (PRATTR) 
Tidiness 
Freshness 
Assortment 
Kindness personnel 
Special offers 
Prices 
6.16 
5.50 
6.09 
7.08 
7.09 
6.54 
7.66 
7.82 
8.17 
7.92 
7.89 
8.11 
.968 
.966 
.947 
.832 
.287 
–.434 
–.137 
.102 
–.038 
–.017 
.911 
.830 
* All store dimensions are measured on a 10-point scale (1=lowest, 10=highest). 
** Each supermarket is rated on each dimension by 8000 households through exit interviews;  
The mean rate reflects the average value over twenty super market chains. 
 47
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
The paper is part of the first author’s dissertation. A major part of the research has been 
conducted at Tilburg University and the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. The authors thank 
GfK Panel Services for providing the data. They thank Els Gijsbrechts, Marnik Dekimpe, and 
Richard Paap for useful comments on a previous version. 
 48
REFERENCES 
ACNielsen (2002). ACNielsen Consumer Insight Magazine, 02(02). 
Baumeister, R. F., & Leary, M.R. (1995). The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal 
attachments as a fundamental human motivation. Psychological Bulletin, 117 (3), 497-
529. 
Bawa, K. and R.W. Shoemaker (1987). The effects of a direct mail coupon on brand choice 
behavior. Journal of Marketing Research, 24 (4), 370-376. 
Bell, D. R., & Lal, R. (2003). The impact of frequent shopper programs in grocery retailing. 
Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 1 (2), 179-202. 
Bell, D. R., & Lattin, J.M. (1998). Shopping behavior and consumer preference for store price 
format: Why "large basket" shoppers prefer EDLP. Marketing Science, 17 (1), 66-88. 
Berger, P. D., Bolton, R.N.,  Bowman D., Briggs E., Kumar, V., Parasuraman, A., & Creed, 
T. (2002). Marketing actions and the value of customer assets: A framework for 
customer asset management. Journal of Service Research, 5 (1), 39-54. 
Bhattacharya, C.B., Rao, H., & Glynn, M.A. (1995). Understanding the bond of identification: 
An investigation of its correlates among art museum members. Journal of Marketing, 
59 (4), 46-57. 
Bhattacharya, C.B. & Sen S. (2003). Consumer-company identification: A framework for 
understanding consumers' relationships with companies. Journal of Marketing, 67 (2), 
76-88. 
Bolton, R.N., Kannan, P.K., & Bramlett, M.D. (2000). Implications of loyalty program 
membership and service experiences for customer retention and value. Journal of the 
Academy of Marketing Science, 28 (1), 95-108. 
Bolton, R.N., Lemon K.N., & Verhoef, P.C. (2004). The theoretical underpinnings of 
customer asset management: A framework and propositions for future research. 
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 32 (3), 271-293. 
Chamberlain, G. & Griliches, Z. (1975). Unobservables with a variance-components 
structure: Ability, schooling, and the success of brothers. International Economic 
Review, 16 (2), 422-449. 
Chandon, P., Wansink, B., & Laurent, G. (2000). A benefit congruency framework of sales 
promotion effectiveness. Journal of Marketing, 64 (4), 65-81. 
Cioletti, J. (2001). Super marketing: Points of sale. Supermarket Business, 56 (5), 37. 
Day, G.S. (2000). Managing marketing relationships. Journal of the Academy of Marketing 
Science, 28 (1), 24-30. 
DeWulf, K., Odekerken-Schröder, G., & Iacobucci, D. (2001). Investments in consumer 
relationships: A cross-country and cross-industry exploration. Journal of Marketing, 
65 (4), 33-50. 
Dick, A. S. & Basu, K. (1994). Customer loyalty: Toward an integrated conceptual 
framework. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 22 (2), 99-113. 
Dick, A.S. & Lord, K.R. (1998). The impact of membership fees on consumer attitude and 
choice. Psychology & Marketing, 15 (1), 41-58. 
Dowling, G. R. & Uncles, M. (1997). Do customer loyalty programs really work? Sloan 
Management Review, 38 (4), 71-82. 
Drèze, X. & Hoch, S.J. (1998). Exploiting the installed base using cross-merchandising and 
category destination programs. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 15 
(5), 459-71. 
Edvardsson, B., Johnson, M.D., Gustafsson, A., & Strandvik, T. (2000). The effects of 
satisfaction and loyalty on profits and growth: Products versus services. Total Quality 
Management, 11 (7), 917-27. 
 49
Erdem, T. & Keane, M.P (1996). Decision-making under uncertainty: Capturing dynamic 
brand choice processes in turbulent consumer goods markets. Marketing Science, 15 
(1), 1-20 
Feinberg, F.M., Krishna, A., & Zhang, Z.J. (2002). Do we care what others get? A behaviorist 
approach to targeted promotions. Journal of Marketing Research, 39 (3), 277-91. 
Fournier, S. (1998). Consumers and their brands: Developing relationship theory in consumer 
research. Journal of Consumer Research, 24 (4), 343-73. 
Franses, P.H. (2005). On the use of marketing models for policy simulation. Journal of 
Marketing Research , 42 (1), 4-14. 
Gatignon, H. & Vosgerau, J. (2006). Moderating effects: The myth of mean centering. 
INSEAD Working Paper, version April 2006. 
Geyskens, I., Steenkamp, J.B.E.M., Scheer, L.K., & Kumar, N. (1996). The effects of trust 
and interdependence on relationship commitment: A transatlantic study. International 
Journal of Research in Marketing, 13 (4), 303-17. 
Gönül, F., & Srinivasan, K. (1996). Estimating the impact of consumer expectations on 
purchase behavior: A dynamic structural model. Marketing Science, 15 (3), 262-279. 
Greene, W.H. (2000). Econometric Analysis London: Prentice Hall International. 
Hair, J.F. Jr., Black, W.C., Babin, B.J., Anderson, R.E., & Tatham, R.L.(2006). Multivariate 
data analysis (6th ed.) Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall. 
Hanssens, D. M., Parsons, L.J., & Schultz, R.L. (2001). Market response models: 
Econometric and time series analysis. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Hsee, C.K., Yu, F., Zhang, J., & Zhang, Y. (2003). Medium maximization. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 30 (1), 1-14. 
Jain, D. C. & Singh, S.S. (2002). Customer lifetime value research in marketing: A review 
and future directions. Journal of Interactive Marketing, 16 (2), 34-46. 
Johnson, M.D., Gustafsson, A., Andreassen, T.W. Lervik, L., & Cha, J. (2001). The evolution 
and future of national customer satisfaction index models. Journal of Economic 
Psychology, 22 (2), 217-45. 
Kahn, B. & McAlister, L. (1997).  How do customers decide where to purchase groceries? 
Reading, Massachusetts: Addison, Wesley. 
Kahn, B.E. & Schmittlein, D.C. (1992). The relationship between purchases made on 
promotion and shopping trip behavior.  Journal of Retailing, 68 (3), 294-315. 
Kim, B., Shi, M. & Srinivasan, K. (2001). Reward programs and tacit collusion. Marketing 
Science, 20 (2), 99-120. 
Kivetz, R. & Simonson, I. (2002a). Earning the right to indulge: Effort as a determinant of 
customer preferences towards frequency program rewards. Journal of Marketing 
Research, 39 (2), 155-70. 
---- (2002b). The role of effort advantage in consumer response to loyalty programs: The 
idiosyncratic fit heuristic. Journal of Marketing Research, 40 (4), 454-459. 
Klemperer, P. (1987). The competitiveness of markets with switching costs. Rand Journal of 
Economics, 18 (1), 138-50. 
Kopalle, P.K. & Neslin, S.A. (2003). The economic viability of frequency reward programs in 
a strategic competitive environment. Review of Marketing Science, 1 (1), 1-39. 
Koslowsky, S. (1999). Reducing your risk: What's happening in retail database marketing. 
Direct Marketing, 61 (9), 40-42. 
Kumar, V. & Reinartz, D.R. (2005). Customer relationship management: A database 
approach. New York: Wiley. 
Leeflang, P.S.H., Wittink, D.R., Wedel, M., & Naert, P.A. (2000). Building models for 
marketing decisions Boston:  Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 50
Leenheer, J. & Bijmolt, T.H.A. (2003). The adoption and effectiveness of loyalty programs: 
The retailer’s perspective. MSI working paper series, report 03-124.  
Lewis, H.G. (1997). Does your "loyalty" program inspire any loyalty? Direct Marketing 59 
(6), 46-48. 
Lewis, M. (2004). The influence of loyalty programs and short-term promotions on customer 
retention. Journal of Marketing Research, 41(4), 281-292.  
Liebermann, Y. (1999). Membership clubs as a tool for enhancing buyers' patronage. Journal 
of Business Research, 45 (3), 291-97. 
Liston-Heyes, C. (2002). Pie in the sky? Real versus perceived values of air miles. Journal of 
Consumer Policy. 25 (1), 1-27. 
Mägi, A.W. (2003). Share of wallet in retailing: The effects of customer satisfaction, loyalty 
cards and shopper characteristics. Journal of Retailing, 109 (2), 1-11. 
Mauri, C. (2003). Card loyalty. A new emerging issue in grocery retailing. Journal of 
Retailing and Consumer Services, 10 (1), 13-25. 
Mittal, B. (1994). An integrated framework for relating diverse consumer characteristics to 
supermarket coupon redemption. Journal of Marketing Research, 31 (4), 533-44. 
Muniz, A.M. & O'Guinn, T.C. (2001). Brand community. Journal of Consumer Research, 27 
(4), 412-32. 
Nakanishi, M. & Cooper, L.C. (1982). Simplified estimation procedures for MCI models. 
Marketing Science, 1 (3), 314-20. 
Noble, S. M. & Phillips, J. (2004). Relationship hindrance: Why would consumers not want a 
relationship with a retailer? Journal of Retailing, 80(2), 289-303.  
Nunes, J.C. & Drèze X. (2006). Your loyalty program is betraying you. Harvard Business 
Review, 84 (April), 124-131.  
Odin, Y., Odin, N., & Valette-Florence, P. (2001). Conceptual and operational aspects of 
brand loyalty: an empirical investigation. Journal of Business Research, 53 (2), 75-84. 
Oliver, R.L. (1999). Whence consumer loyalty?, Journal of Marketing, 63 (Special Issue), 33-
44. 
Phelps, J., D'Souza, G., & Nowak, G. (2001) Antecedents and consequences of consumer 
privacy concerns: An empirical investigation. Journal of Interactive Marketing, 15 (4), 
2-17. 
Phelps, J., Nowak, G., & Ferrell, E. (2000). Privacy concerns and consumer willingness to 
provide personal information. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 19 (1), 27-41. 
Roehm, M. L., Pullins, E.B., & Roehm Jr., H.A. (2002). Designing loyalty-building programs 
for packaged goods brands. Journal of Marketing Research, 39 (2), 202-13. 
Rossi, P.E., McCulloch, R.E., & Allenby, G.M. (1996) The value of purchase history data in 
target marketing. Marketing Science, 15 (4), 321-40. 
Schindler, R.M. (1998). Consequences of perceiving oneself as responsible for obtaining a 
discount: Evidence for smart-shopper feelings. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 7 
(4), 371-92. 
Sharp, B. & Sharp, A. (1997). Loyalty programs and their impact on repeat-purchase loyalty 
patterns. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 14 (5), 473-86. 
Taylor, G.A. & Neslin, S.A. (2005). The current and future sales impact of a retail frequency 
reward program. Journal of Retailing, 81 (4), 293-305. 
Thomas, J.S. (2001). A methodology for linking customer acquisition to customer retention. 
Journal of Marketing Research, 38 (2), 262-68. 
Van Dijk, A., Van Heerde, H.J., Leeflang, P.S.H., & Wittink, D.R. (2004). Similarity-based 
spatial methods to estimate shelf space elasticities, Quantitative Marketing and 
Economics, 2 (September), 257-277. 
 51
Van Heerde, H.J. & Bijmolt, T.H.A. (2005). Decomposing the promotional revenue bump for 
loyalty program members versus nonmembers, Journal of Marketing Research, 42 (4), 
443-457. 
Van Osselaer, S.M.J., Alba, J.W., & Manchanda, P. (2003). Irrelevant information and 
mediated intertemporal choice. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 14 (2), 257-274. 
Von Wangenheim, F. & Bayón, T. (2006), Effects of capacity-driven service experiences on 
customer usage levels: Why revenue management systems are due for change. MSI 
working paper series, report 06-103. 
Verbeek, M. (2000). A guide to modern econometrics. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, LTD. 
Wooldridge, J.M. (2002). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
Yi, Y. & Jeon, H. (2003). Effects of loyalty programs on value perception, program loyalty, 
and brand loyalty, Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 31 (3), 229-40. 
Zhang, Z. J., Krishna, A. & Dhar, S.K. (2000). The optimal choice of promotional vehicles: 
front-loaded or rear-loaded incentives, Management Science, 46 (3), 348-62.  
 
 
 
Publications in the Report Series Research∗ in Management 
 
ERIM Research Program: “Marketing” 
 
2006 
The Effect of Feedback and Learning on DSS Evaluations 
Ujwal Kayande, Arnaud de Bruyn, Gary Lilien, Arvind Rangaswamy and Gerrit Van Bruggen 
ERS-2006-001-MKT 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7302
 
Interaction Between Shelf Layout and Marketing Effectiveness and Its Impact On Optimizing Shelf Arrangements 
Erjen van Nierop, Dennis Fok and Philip Hans Franses 
ERS-2006-013-MKT 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7632
 
Institutional Forecasting: The Performance of Thin Virtual Stock Markets 
Gerrit H. Van Bruggen, Martin Spann, Gary L. Lilien and Bernd Skiera 
ERS-2006-028-MKT 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7840
 
Irritation Due to Direct Mailings from Charities 
Merel van Diepen, Bas Donkers and Philip Hans Franses 
ERS-2006-029-MKT 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7832
 
When Should Nintendo Launch its Wii? Insights From a Bivariate Successive Generation Model 
Philip Hans Franses and Carlos Hernández-Mireles 
ERS-2006-032-MKT 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7867
 
How Feedback Can Improve Managerial Evaluations of Model-based Marketing Decision Support Systems 
Ujwal Kayande, Arnaud de Bruyn, Gary Lilien, Arvind Rangaswamy and Gerrit van Bruggen 
ERS-2006-039-MKT 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7893
 
Moving in Social Circles – Social Circle Membership and Performance Implications 
Willem Verbeke and Stefan Wuyts 
ERS-2006-041-MKT 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7899
 
Polysemy in Advertising 
Stefano Puntoni, Jonathan E. Schroeder and Mark Ritson 
ERS-2006-043-MKT 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7898
 
Categorization by Groups 
Rebecca W. Hamilton, Stefano Puntoni and Nader T. Tavassoli 
ERS-2006-044-MKT 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7900
 
Time-Series Models in Marketing 
Marnik G. Dekimpe, Philip Hans Franses, Dominique M. Hansses and Prasad A. Naik 
ERS-2006-049-MKT 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7984
 
Dynamic and Competitive Effects of Direct Mailings 
Merel van Diepen, Bas Donkers and Philip Hans Franses 
ERS-2006-050-MKT 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7948
Multidimensional Scaling with Regional Restrictions for Facet Theory: An Application to Levi's Political Protest Data 
Patrick J.F. Groenen and Ivo A. van der Lans 
ERS-2006-057-MKT 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8045
 
The Quest for Citations: Drivers of Article Impact 
Stefan Stremersch, Isabel Verniers and Peter C. Verhoef 
ERS-2006-061-MKT 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8127
 
“Emotional” versus “Emotioneel”: Advertising Language and Emotional Appraisal 
Stefano Puntoni 
ERS-2006-066-MKT 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8290
 
Do Loyalty Programs Really Enhance Behavioral Loyalty? An Empirical Analysis Accounting for Self-Selecting Members 
Jorna Leenheer, Harald J. van Heerde, Tammo H.A. Bijmolt and Ale Smidts 
ERS-2006-076-MKT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
∗  A complete overview of the ERIM Report Series Research in Management: 
https://ep.eur.nl/handle/1765/1
 
 ERIM Research Programs: 
 LIS Business Processes, Logistics and Information Systems 
 ORG Organizing for Performance 
 MKT Marketing  
 F&A Finance and Accounting 
 STR Strategy and Entrepreneurship  
